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Abstract
This paper shows (i) how entry and exit of rms in a competitive industry
aect the valuation of securities and optimal capital structure, and (ii) how,
given a trade-o between the tax advantages and agency costs, a rm will op-
timally adjust its leverage level after it is set up. We derive simple pricing
expressions for corporate debt in which the price elasticity of demand for in-
dustry output plays a crucial role. When a rm optimally adjusts its leverage
over time, we show that total rm value comprises the value of discounted cash-
ows assuming xed capital structure plus a continuum of options for marginal
increases in debt.
2
Valuation theory in nancial economics is generally concerned with obtaining re-
strictions on the joint distribution of asset returns from assumptions on payos or
preferences. Few attempts have been made to link the pricing of securities to char-
acteristics of the factor and product markets in which rms operate. Making such a
link is dicult because it requires explicit modelling of a full industry equilibrium.
The impact of debt in industry equilibrium with imperfectly competitive rms
has been investigated in a series of papers by Brander and Lewis (1986,1988) and
Maksimovic (1988,1990). These papers focus primarily on the way in which debt
nancing may enable rms to commit to particular ex post behavior in imperfectly
competitive markets. Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) also study debt and industry
equilibrium but are mainly concerned with agency costs. With the exception of
Maksimovic (1988), all these models are static and it is not obvious how they could
be employed for pricing.
In this paper, we study the interaction between bond pricing, industry equilibrium
and optimal capital structure. In particular, we derive explicit solutions for the value
of corporate bonds that depend in a simple, transparent manner on the elasticity
of demand for total industry output. We also show how rms will optimally adjust
their leverage levels, both when they are set up and subsequently. In the process, we
obtain a dynamic theory of optimal leverage.
Valuing debt without allowing for dynamic adjustments in leverage appears quite
restrictive. In the absence of leverage adjustment costs and restrictive covenants
on existing debt, rms may wish to adjust their debt levels on a continuous basis.
Brennan and Schwartz (1984) model such behavior. Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner
(1989a,1989b) analyze optimal periodic adjustments of leverage when recapitalization
costs are proportional to bonds issued. As the work of Kane, Marcus and MacDonald
(1984,1985) shows, the residual value of the rm in the event of bankruptcy or when
debt falls due depends on the ability of the rm's owners to adjust the level of leverage
at that point.
Our treatment of releverage behavior resembles that of Fischer, Heinkel and Zech-
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ner in that we examine optimal changes in leverage in the presence of adjustment
costs. However, the cost stucture we assume is quite dierent from theirs since we
suppose that hold-out problems or possibly legal restrictions make it prohibitively
expensive to reduce leverage, but that increases in debt are costless. Roe (1987)
documents how hard it is to renegotiate public bond issues in the US outside formal
bankruptcy proceedings.
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The approach we take in this paper builds on recent work by Leahy (1993). Leahy
shows how Dixit's (1989) continuous time real investment model may be extended to
study a competitive industry equilibrium with entry and exit by rms triggered by
output price movements. Leahy's model, like that of Dixit, assumes pure equity -
nancing of the rm. For industries in which expenditure on xed capital is important,
this assumption seems unattractive. Dierences between corporate and personal tax
rates together with bankruptcy costs will in principle make nancial structure matter
for rm valuation.
Section 1 of the paper sets out a simple model of a single rm which nances an
irreversible investment with a mixture of debt and equity. We demonstrate in this
context the solution methods that will be employed throughout the paper and derive
some preliminary results on optimal capital structure, agency costs and incentives to
adjust leverage levels.
2
Section 2 of the paper incorporates our model of a single rm in an industry
equilibrium. We show that free entry and exit impose reecting barriers on the price
of the industry's output, aecting the valuation of corporate debt and equity and the
optimal capital structure decision.
Our pricing expressions for corporate debt have the interesting feature that, when
equity-holders are cash-constrained, the bonds become riskless as the elasticity of
output demand approaches zero. The reason is that, for low price elasticities, very
few rms have to leave the industry in order to prevent the output price dropping
below the exit trigger level, p
b
. Hence, for a given rm, bankruptcy is a low probability
event and the bonds resemble the safe asset.
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When equity-holders are not cash-constrained and debt is risky, individual rms
entering the industry have an incentive to `under-cut' other rms by adopting marginally
lower leverage. In equilibrium, this incentive forces down the level of borrowing until
all debt is fully collateralized, i.e., at closure equal in value to the residual value of
rms' assets.
Section 3 relaxes the assumption that the leverage level is xed after the rm is
set up. We characterize a rm's optimal dynamic releverage policy, assuming that
increasing leverage is costless but that unlevering can only be accomplished through
liquidation. We justify the latter assumption by supposing that free-rider behavior
by individual bond-holders prevents any capital restructuring agreement that involves
reductions in leverage.
We show that the value of the rm, in these circumstances, equals that of its
discounted cash ows assuming a xed capital structure plus the value of a continuum
of options to increase leverage. These options are exercised successively as the output
price hits new peaks.
1 A SIMPLE BENCHMARK MODEL
1.1 Basic Assumptions
We begin by describing a simple model that demonstrates our solution techniques
and establishes a benchmark. This model will abstract from industry equilibrium
eects in that rm bankruptcies will not aect the basic state variable, the price of
the rm's output.
Suppose that a rm may issue debt or equity to nance the purchase of capital
costing K. We shall initially assume that no adjustment in the level of leverage is
possible after the rm is set up. At the end of this section, and then at more length
in later sections we shall return to this point.
5
The rm's technology is such that output is unity per period of time and it faces
a ow of costs, w, (assumed to be constant through time) as long as production
continues. If p
t
is the price of the rm's output, net earnings equal:
(1  )(p
t
  w) ; (1)
where  is the corporate income tax rate. Implicitly, we assume here that the rm's
dividend policy is xed. One should regard our analysis below of optimal investment
and bankruptcy decisions as conditional on this. Also, suppose that p
t
is a geometric
Brownian motion:
dp
t
= p
t
dt + p
t
dB
t
; (2)
for constants  and  and a standard Brownian motion B
t
.
If the output price falls far enough, earnings will eventually turn negative, obliging
equity-holders to cover operating losses through capital injections.
3
Bankruptcy will
be triggered by the equity-holders' decision to cease injecting funds.
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A crucial question for valuing debt is then: what is the residual value of the rm
after bankruptcy? To emphasize the wide applicability of our results, we develop our
models with a general residual value function, X(p). The only restriction we place
on the function X(p) is that it be non-decreasing in its argument.
Assumption 1 The residual value of the rm after bankruptcy is a function X(p
t
)
of the output price where X
0
(p)  0 for all p  0.
Our approach is suciently general to encompass various assumptions made in
past studies. For example, classic studies of debt valuation such as Merton (1974) and
Black and Cox (1976) have supposed that after bankruptcy, bond-holders receive the
value of the rm's assets which are assumed to follow a simple geometric Brownian
motion. On the other hand, Mello and Parsons (1992) assume that when bankruptcy
occurs, bond-holders receive the pure equity value of the rm, i.e. a basic asset value
following a geometric Brownian motion as in Merton (1974) plus the option value
associated with liquidation possibilities.
5
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In fact, neither the Merton-Black-Cox nor the Mello-Parsons approach is ideal.
Bond-holders taking control after bankruptcy may relever a rm in a variety of ways.
The options associated with releverage possibilities are likely to form an important
part of the rm's value and hence aect the premia on corporate debt well before
bankruptcy occurs. Our approach is suciently general to allow for such options.
As well as specifying the residual value function, X(p
t
), to price debt in indus-
try equilibrium, one needs to make assumptions about what bankruptcy implies for
the output level of the rm. Specically, if a rm ceases to produce when it goes
bankrupt, this may aect industry output and feed back into the protability of
other corporations.
The models we develop below will vary according to whether industry output falls
when rms go bankrupt. In the benchmark model of this section, industry output is
assumed not to fall and hence the price process, p
t
, can be treated as fully exogenous.
Finally, note that we do not allow the equity-holders in our model to suspend
production temporarily. Such `moth-balling' of productive activities and the real
option values that it can induce have been studied by Brennan and Schwartz (1984)
and Mello and Parsons (1992).
1.2 Debt and Equity Valuation
Let us suppose that the rm is nanced with equity and innite maturity debt, paying
a xed coupon, b. If agents are risk neutral,
6
and r is the constant risk-free interest
rate,
7
the rm's total equity and debt values, V
t
and L
t
must satisfy:
rV
t
= (1  )(p
t
  w   b) +
d
d
E
t
V
t+





=0
; (3)
rL
t
= b +
d
d
E
t
L
t+





=0
; (4)
where b is the ow of coupon payments on the rm's debt. In words, the expected
return from investing amounts V
t
or L
t
in the safe asset must equal the expected
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return from investing in the rm's equity or debt. For simplicity, we assume that, at
a personal level, all income is taxed at the same rate and, hence, personal tax rates
drop out of the above equilibrium conditions. Note that we also assume in the above
equations that interest payments are tax deductible. This assumption introduces a
tax advantage to leverage.
If V
t
and L
t
are twice-continuously dierentiable functions of the state variable,
p
t
, we may apply Ito's lemma to obtain:
rV (p
t
) = (1  )(p
t
  w   b) + V
0
(p
t
)p
t
 + V
00
(p
t
)p
2
t

2
2
; (5)
rL(p
t
) = b + L
0
(p
t
)p
t
 + L
00
(p
t
)p
2
t

2
2
: (6)
The appropriate boundary conditions are as follows. If the rm is closed at some
price p
b
, then, in the absence of arbitrage, V (p
b
) = 0 and L(p
b
) = X(p
b
). As p
t
!1,
the possibility of closure plays a smaller and smaller role in valuation, so V and L
must approach the unlimited liability values of the income streams, i.e.,
lim
p!1
V (p) = E
t

Z
1
t
exp[ r(s  t)](1  )(p
s
  w   b)ds

; (7)
lim
p!1
L(p) = E
t

Z
1
t
exp[ r(s  t)]b ds

: (8)
The right hand side terms may readily be calculated as: lim
p!1
V (p) = (1 )(p
t
=(r 
)  (w + b)=r) and lim
p!1
L(p) = b=r.
Finally, since equity-holders may always cover operating losses by injecting capi-
tal,
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the closure price, p
b
, is eectively their choice. Hence, p
b
will be determined so
as to maximize the value of equity-holders' claims, V (p
t
). As Dixit (1992a) and Du-
mas (1992) show, the relevant condition determining p
b
is a smooth-pasting equation
for total equity at the trigger price, i.e., V
0
(p
b
) = 0.
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Applying the above boundary
conditions and supposing that V (p
t
) and L(p
t
) satisfy equations (5) and (6), one may
obtain explicit solutions for equity and bond values.
Proposition 1 Let the rm's output price be exogenously given and equal to the
process given in equation (2). If the ow of coupon payments is xed at b and debt is
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risky in that the residual rm value at closure is less than the face value of the debt,
the value of the rm's equity and bonds, L
t
and V
t
satisfy:
V (p
t
) = (1  )
"
p
t
r   
 
w + b
r
#
  (1  )
"
p
b
r   
 
w + b
r
#  
p
t
p
b
!

1
; (9)
L(p
t
) =
b
r
+
 
X(p
b
)  
b
r
!  
p
t
p
b
!

1
; (10)
where 
1
is the negative root of the quadratic equation: (  1)
2
=2 +  = r, and
where the close-down price, p
b
, equals
p
b
=  

1
1  
1
r   
r
(w + b) : (11)
The proofs of this and subsequent propositions are sketched in the Appendix.
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Figure 1 depicts the solution given in Proposition 1 for the simple case in which
X(p) = 0 for all p. Note that the equity and bond values approach the unlimited
liability values as p!1, that V (p) smooth-pastes at p
b
and that L(p) hits X(p) (in
this case the horizontal axis) obliquely.
1.3 Optimal Leverage
How then is the level of leverage determined? First, suppose that equity-holders have
access to unlimited external resources, for example because outside equity is available
in any quantity. In this case, leverage will be set to maximise the unconstrained ex
ante value of the rm. LetW (p
t
; b) denote the total value of the rm for some leverage
level, b. Then:
W (p
t
; b) =
(
(1  )
"
p
t
r   
 
w
r
#
+
b
r
)
+
"
X(p
b
) 
(
(1  )
"
p
b
r   
 
w
r
#
+
b
r
)# 
p
t
p
b
!

1
:
(12)
Suppose that the rm is set up when the output price is at some initial level, p
i
. The
capital structure will then be chosen so as to maximize W (p
i
; b). In particular, the
optimal b will be the root of the rst order condition @W (p
i
; b

)=@b = 0.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that equity-holders have access to unlimited external resources.
Let the rm's output price be exogenously given and equal to the process given in equa-
tion (2). If the ow of coupon payments is xed at b and debt is risky in that the
face value of debt exceeds the residual assets available at closure, the optimal capital
structure conditional on some initial price, p
i
, is the root of the equation:

r
0
@
1 
 
p
i
p
b
!

1
1
A
=  

1
w + b
b
r
 
p
i
p
b
!

1
+
1
w + b
[X
0
(p
b
)p
b
  
1
X(p
b
)] ; (13)
where p
b
is dened as in Proposition 1. When X(p) = 0 for all p, one may show that
(13) has a unique solution and that this is an optimum.
The optimal degree of leverage indicated by equation (13) sets the probability-weighted
marginal tax benet, (1 (p
t
=p
b
)

1
)=r, equal to the net discounted marginal bankruptcy
cost stemming from an inecient choice of closure point by equity-holders who select
p
b
to maximize V (p
t
) rather than W (p
t
). Of the two terms on the right hand side
of equation (13), the rst measures the eect of additional leverage in accelerating
bankruptcy and hence the loss of the tax shield. The second reects the fact that as
debt increases, equity-holders may precipitate bankruptcy and hence switch to the
residual value function, X(p
t
), at an inecient time.
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal capital structure decision. In the top panel, W
b

@W (p
i
; b)=@b is drawn as an increasing function of p
i
for two dierent coupon ows,
b
L
and b
H
. The points at which the schedules cross the horizontal give the the
prices, p
L
i
and p
H
i
, for which such leverage would be optimal, while their intersections
with the BB schedule indicate the prices at which these levels of debt would trigger
bankruptcy.
11
The lower panel of Figure 2 shows how optimal leverage increases with
the entry price. Later in the paper where we allow for increases in leverage, we nd
that the option of waiting shifts the LL schedule to the right.
How is the leverage decision aected if the total amount of equity capital is con-
strained? Several recent papers have studied capital structure under this assumption
(see, for example, Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore (1994) and Anderson
and Sundaresan (1996)). Such situations can arise if rm prots are unveriable by
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holders of external equity. Equity claims then can only be held by rm insiders who
combine ownership with control of the rm's operations. Within our framework, one
may suppose that equity-holders have a maximum sum J to invest in the rm and
that L(p
i
; b

)+ J < K where K is the initial capital cost of establishing the rm and
b

is the level of leverage that maximises ex ante rm value. If there exists a
~
b such
that L(p
i
;
~
b) + J  K, then the rm will be set up but with a sub-optimally high
level of debt. In particular, b will be the root of L(p
i
;
~
b) + J = K.
1.4 Agency Costs
Note that the closure price which maximizes the ex ante value of the rm, call it p
b
is not equal to the liquidation price chosen by equity-holders, p
b
. This leads to an
agency cost. If equity-holders could commit before the rm is set up to close the rm
at p
b
, the ex ante value of the rm would be higher. The debt remains fairly priced
since bond-holders correctly anticipate that equity-holders will close the rm at p
b
,
but this outcome is still inecient. The agency cost, which resembles the agency
costs investigated by, for example, Myers (1977), may be calculated as follows.
Proposition 3 Let the rm's output price be exogenously given and equal to the
process given in equation (2). If the ow of coupon payments is xed at b and debt is
risky in that the face value exceeds the residual assets available at closure, the agency
cost equals:
W (p
i
; b)   W (p
i
; b) ; (14)
where W is the same as in equation (12) except that p
b
is replaced by p
b
where:
p
b
=
 
1
1  
1
r   
r
(
w  
b
1  
 
r
1  
1

1
(
1
X(p
b
)  p
b
X
0
(p
b
))
)
: (15)
Since X
0
(p) is non-negative, by assumption, for all p > 0, it follows that p
b
 p
b
.
The last sentence of the Proposition highlights the fact that the closure price that
maximizes rm value, p
b
, is lower than that which would be chosen by equity-holders
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maximizing their own equity value, p
b
. The reasons are equity-holders ignore (i)
the tax shield that may be lost when the rm closes, and (ii) do not internalize the
residual value of the rm in their choice of closure time.
1.5 Incentives to Adjust Leverage
The last point we wish to make in this preliminary section relates to incentives for
adjustments in capital structure after the rm is set up. Below we shall develop a
dynamic theory of capital structure but, for the moment, we assume that the leverage
level is xed by the initial agreement between equity-holders and bond-holders. The
following proposition shows the degree to which this assumption is restrictive.
Proposition 4 In the model of this section, excluding side payments, equity-holders
will never wish to buy back marginal amounts of the rm's debt. Equally, in the
absence of side payments, if X(p
b
) and X
0
(p
b
) are small, bond-holders will never
prefer that the rm issue more debt of the same seniority.
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Equity-holders' reluctance to unlever at the margin reects the fact that reducing
leverage cuts the option value associated with limited liability implicit in the value
of equity. If equity-holders could agree on side-payments from the bond-holders who
remain after the debt buy-back (the latter benet because the rm moves further from
the liquidation point and so might be willing to pay), they might wish to purchase
marginal amounts of debt. Otherwise, only discrete reductions in leverage could be
in the interests of equity-holders.
However, if some debt-holders try to free ride, demanding special treatment in the
buy-back, the eect may be to make even discrete reductions in leverage too expensive
as far as equity-holders are concerned. The standard solution to this problem is a
take-it-or-leave-it oer conditional on everyone accepting. Such a strategy is not
really implementable in practice since debt is often dispersed among many creditors
and take-it-or-leave-it oers are not credible. This provides a justication for the
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assumption made here that rms cannot unlever.
The second part of Proposition 4 states that, so long as the residual post-bankruptcy
value of the rm is small and insensitive to the output price, p
t
, bond-holders will
tend to resist increases in leverage. Although bond covenants do commonly limit
rms' ability to increase borrowing, we regard the assumption made in this section
and the next that rms cannot raise their leverage as simply a benchmark case. The
assumption is open to criticism as precluding leverage adjustments may seriously im-
pair the ex ante value of the rm by impeding optimal exploitation of tax advantages
after the rm is set up. In Section 3, we show how this assumption may be relaxed
by developing a theory of optimal dynamic releverage.
The above model has provided a benchmark case. We now wish to show how one
can (i) endogenize the output price by embedding the above model in an industry
equilibrium, and (ii) incorporate optimal dynamic adjustments in leverage.
2 INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM
2.1 The Output Price in Industry Equilibrium
Consider an industry with a large number of identical rms all possessing the technol-
ogy and cost structure described in the last section. Again, we limit attention to the
case in which, once the rm is set up, changes in the level of leverage are impossible.
First, let us examine the equilibrium that arises if equity-holders are cash-constrained
as described in 1.3. In Section 2.4 below, we discuss how the industry equilibrium
changes when this assumption is altered to permit equity-holders an unconstrained
choice of capital structure.
Assume that the inverse demand function for industry output is:
p
t
= x
t
D(q
t
) ; (16)
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where q
t
is the number of rms active at time t, which will turn out to be endogenous
variable in this model. (For simplicity, we take q
t
to be a stochastic process with
continous rather than integer support.) Since each rm produces a unit of output, q
t
is also the total output of the industry. Assume for simplicity that the good is not
storable so that industry output equals supply. Suppose that D(:) is a continuously
dierentiable, monotonically declining function and x
t
is an exogenous stochastic
process reecting taste shocks. Specically, we assume that x
t
is a geometric Brownian
motion with constant parameters,  and . Application of Ito's lemma and the
assumption (to be justied below) that q
t
is a nite variation process yields:
dp
t
= p
t
D
0
(q
t
)=D(q
t
)dq
t
+ p
t
dt+ p
t
dB
t
; (17)
where B
t
is a standard Brownian motion. We suppose that there is an innite pool
of potential rms and that, apart from a lump sum cost of entry, they may enter
the industry costlessly. Output increases if prices rise to such a point that it is
protable for some of these rms to enter. Since all rms are identical and entry is
free apart from xed capital costs, the price process can never pass the level at which
entry is protable for an individual rm. Hence, the term, p
t
D
0
(q
t
)=D(q
t
) acts like
a \stochastic regulator", keeping p
t
below the entry price, p
e
. A similar argument
applies for the price p
b
at which rms wish to leave the industry. Thus, the price
process may be thought of as a doubly reected geometric Brownian motion with
barriers, p
b
and p
e
, i.e.,
dp
t
= p
t
dt+ p
t
dB
t
+ dM
b
t
+ dM
e
t
; (18)
where M
b
t
and M
e
t
are monotonically increasing and decreasing stochastic regulator
processes. Formally, M
b
t
and M
e
t
may be written as:
M
e
t
= sup
0t
[minfp
e
  (p

  p
b
) M
b
t
; 0g] ; (19)
M
b
t
= sup
0t
[minfp

  p
b
 M
e
t
; 0g] : (20)
(See Harrison (1985), page 22.) V
t
and L
t
continue to satisfy the dierential equations
(5) and (6) but the relevant boundary conditions are now somewhat dierent.
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2.2 Industry Equilibrium Boundary Conditions
First, consider the value of equity. To rule out arbitrage, it must be the case, as before,
that V (p
b
) = 0. Instead of the asymptotic condition on V for high prices, however,
the second boundary condition for V is now V
0
(p
e
) = 0. To understand this condition,
note that as p
t
hits p
e
, the behavior of the process changes, with upward movements
in the innite variation term, p
t
dB
t
being cancelled by osetting movements in the
stochastic regulator. The solution can satisfy the equilibrium condition (3) both at
p
e
and at points close to p
e
only if the innite variation part of the equity value,
V
0
(p
t
)p
t
dB
t
vanishes, i.e., if V
0
(p
e
) = 0.
Turning now to the bond value, L
t
, at p
e
we again have a reecting barrier con-
dition, in this case L
0
(p
e
) = 0. At the lower price barrier, p
b
, however, the condition
is much less standard. We shall suppose that when p
t
hits p
b
, each rm has an equal
chance of leaving the industry. (Other assumptions are possible and we comment fur-
ther below.) Now, for each rm, when p
t
hits p
b
, the probability of liquidation equals
the proportion of rms that exit, dq
t
=q
t
. The expected capital loss to bond-holders
due to liquidation is, therefore, L(p
b
)dq
t
=q
t
. Balancing this must be some probability
of capital gains in bond values in the event that the output price rises.
To express this balancing of expected gains and losses more formally, recall that
p
t
= x
t
D(q
t
) and that when regulation occurs, p
t
is xed. Hence, we can write output
quantity changes in the neighborhood of p
b
in terms of changes in the p
b
stochastic
regulator as follows:
dM
b
t
=
p
t
D
0
(q
t
)
D(q
t
)
dq
t
: (21)
The marginal cost of applying the p
b
stochastic regulator (because of expected capital
losses) may, therefore, be written as:
 
dq
t
q
t
(L
t
 X
t
) =  
D(q
t
)
D
0
(q
t
)q
t
(L
t
 X
t
)
p
t
dM
b
t
: (22)
But, Harrison (1985) shows (see his Corollary 4, page 83) that the appropriate bound-
ary condition in such models sets the costs of regulation equal to the rst derivative
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of the relevant discounted integral (in our case, L
t
), i.e.,
L
0
(p
b
) =  
D(q
t
)
D
0
(q
t
)q
t
(L(p
b
) X(p
b
))
p
b
: (23)
This condition is in itself quite interesting. D(q
t
)=jD
0
(q
t
)q
t
j is the price elasticity of
demand for the industry's output. If we take D(q
t
) to be isoelastic, then we have,
L
0
(p
b
)p
b
L(p
b
) X(p
b
)
=





@q(p
b
)
@p
p
b
q
t





=  ; (24)
for some constant, . In the remainder of the paper, we shall suppose that D(q) is
isoelastic.
Figure 3, which is drawn for the special case in which X(p) = 0 for all p, illustrates
what is going on. By appropriate choice of units, bond value, L, and aggregate
demand, q, are shown as (locally-linearized) functions of price intersecting at C where
prices equal p
b
. For a given rm, the expected capital loss due to liquidation if the
forcing process, x
t
, falls by x equals 
2
 L(p
b
)CD=CE. On the other hand, if x
t
rises by x, bond-holders gain 
1
. Our elasticity condition is equivalent to 
1
= 
2
,
ensuring that the expected capital gains and losses cancel.
Finally, we require two conditions to determine the trigger prices, p
b
and p
e
.
p
b
is chosen by equity-holders who, at that price, are indierent between leaving
the industry or staying in production. The relevant condition is then V
0
(p
b
) = 0.
The upper trigger price is given by our assumption of free entry and consists of
V (p
e
) + L(p
e
) = K, where K is the cost of setting up the rm.
2.3 Valuing Debt and Equity
The following values of debt and equity may then be obtained:
Proposition 5 In industry equilibrium when the ow of coupon payments is xed at
b, the values of bonds and equity are given by:
V (p
t
) = (1  )

p
t
r   
 
w + b
r

  (1  )

p
b
r   
 
w + b
r


1
"

2

p
t
p
b


1
  
1

p
e
p
b


1

p
t
p
e


2
#
;
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
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

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#
; (25)
L(p
t
) =
b
r
+

X(p
b
) 
b
r

 
2
"

2

p
t
p
b


1
  
1

p
e
p
b


1

p
t
p
e


2
#
; (26)
where 
1
and 
2
equal:

1
= (
2
  
1
(p
e
=p
b
)

1
 
2
)
 1
; (27)

2
= (
2
(   
1
)  
1
(   
2
)(p
e
=p
b
)

1
 
2
)
 1
: (28)
p
e
and p
b
are the roots to the free entry condition, V (p
e
)+L(p
e
) = K, and the equity-
holders' optimality condition for the timing of bankruptcy, V
0
(p
b
) = 0. 
1
and 
2
are
the negative and positive roots respectively of the quadratic equation: (  1)
2
=2 +
 = r.  is the constant price elasticity of demand for industry output.
Proposition 5 derives equity and debt values for a given coupon ow b. If equity-
holders are cash-constrained, having a maximum of J available to invest, then b will
be determined by the equation L(p
e
; b) = K   J .
We portray the equilibrium industry dynamics in Figure 4. At the entry price,
p
e
, the combined value of bonds and equity, W (p
e
), equals the capital cost, K. At
the lower trigger point p
b
, equity value is zero and optimality requires that V
0
(p
b
) =
0. Again, we assume for simplicity that X(p) = 0 for all p, so that the boundary
condition for bonds is L
0
(p
b
)p
b
=L(p
b
) = . This is equivalent to the tangency shown
between the W function and the ray starting at p
b
  =p
b
, since at the bankruptcy
price, p
b
, V = V
0
= 0,
L
0
(p
b
)p
b
L(p
b
)
=
W
0
(p
b
)p
b
W (p
b
)
=
W (p
b
)
a
p
b
W (p
b
)
=  : (29)
In the lower panel of Figure 4, we illustrate the equilibrium that prevails when the
elasticity of demand is low, specically when   1. Ceteris paribus, a low elasticity
means that only a few rms need to close to regulate the output price at p
b
, i.e.,
individual rms face a small chance of bankruptcy. For this reason, bond values,
represented by the distance W   V in the gure, do not decrease greatly even when
prices approach the bankruptcy trigger.
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How do the trigger prices compare with those of an unlevered rm? The latter are
shown as the prices at points C and E in the lower panel where the schedule U gives
the value of a pure equity rm. Evidently, leverage has narrowed the distance between
the trigger points. The tax deductibility of interest payments encourages entry at a
lower price, while the impact of coupon payments on equity-holders' income ow
induces a higher price trigger for exit.
Above, we supposed that, when p
t
hits p
b
, each rm has an equal chance of being
liquidated. Other approaches to \ordering" liquidation across rms are possible, e.g.
some deterministic ordering of rms based on dierences in their wage costs. This
would aect both bond and equity claims which would both become functions of the
number of rms left in the industry, q
t
, as well as of the output price, p
t
.
It should be stressed that our assumption of an isoelastic industry demand func-
tion is crucial in allowing us to obtain simple closed form results. Any other speci-
cation would mean that the boundary condition to the bond prices would depend
on q
t
. The solutions would then be functions of two state variables (p
t
and q
t
) rather
than one (p
t
). Of course, numerical solutions would still be available in the two state
variable case.
Finally, note that M
b
t
and M
e
t
, as monotonically increasing and decreasing pro-
cesses respectively, must be of nite variation. Equation (21) and a similar equation
linking output quantity changes and M
e
t
at the upper barrier, p
e
, imply that q
t
must
also be of nite variation, as claimed prior to equation (17).
2.4 Equilibrium Without Cash Constraints
How is equilibrium aected if equity-holders are not cash-constrained and hence can
freely choose the capital structure at entry? The crucial point to note is that in the
equilibrium described in Proposition 5, when p
t
hits the closure trigger, p
b
, debt value
(and hence total rm value) of any rm that closes experiences a negative jump.
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Suppose that all rms adopt a particular coupon ow, b. A rm which at entry
adopts a marginally lower level of coupon payments enjoys the same tax advantages
of leverage but avoids future negative jumps. The reason is that exit by other rms
ensures that the output price never falls to a level at which the equity-holders of the
low-leverage rm are unwilling to cover operating losses.
Thus, so long as bond values jump at closure, a marginal reduction in leverage
(below the level adopted by other rms) discretely increases rm value at entry by
eliminating the possibility of bankruptcy. Firms will therefore `under-cut' each other
at entry, adopting lower and lower levels of leverage. The incentive to undercut
disappears only when bond values are continuous at closure. In this case, the rms
are in a Nash equilibrium, choosing their level of leverage at entry in a way that is
optimal given the behaviour of other rms.
Continuity of bond values at p
b
implies the condition : L(p
b
) = X(p
b
). Since
most rms do not close at p
b
, in the absence of arbitrage possibilities, it must also be
true that L
0
(p
b
) = 0. Together with the entry condition, L
0
(p
e
) = 0, these equations
uniquely determine the debt value and the parameter b. The equity value and the
entry and closure prices are determined by the conditions: V
0
(p
e
) = V (p
b
) = V
0
(p
b
) =
0 and V (p
e
) + L(p
e
) = K.
Solving for debt and equity values subject to these boundary conditions, we obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 6 When equity-holders are not cash constrained and can therefore select
b freely at entry, the value of debt is b=r while total equity value equals that given in
Proposition 5. The closure price p
b
satises the equation X(p
b
) = b=r.
This is a strong result. Competitive pressure induces equity-holders entering the
industry to reduce leverage until the point at which the face value of the debt, b=r,
equals the residual value of the rm's assets available to bond-holders at closure,
X(p
b
). In the special case illustrated in Figure 4 in which the residual value, X(p),
is zero for all p > 0, in the Nash equilibrium, leverage is zero.
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3 OPTIMAL DYNAMIC RELEVERAGE
3.1 Basic Assumptions
In this section, we reimpose the assumption made in Sections 1 and 2 that the output
price is exogenous and behaves as in equation (2). On the other hand, we relax the
assumption made up to this point, that the rm's leverage level is xed up until
the moment of bankruptcy. In so doing, we shall derive a dynamic theory of capital
structure. As mentioned in the Introduction, our approach to releverage resembles
that of Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989a,1989b) in that we will derive optimal
leverage adjustment policies subject to ajustment costs. Our results dier from theirs
because the form of the costs we assume is dierent.
Consider again the single rm model of Section 1. The following assumptions will
combine to yield reasonably tractable pricing expressions.
Assumption 2 Feasible changes in leverage occur so as to maximize the total value
of the rm's securities, W (p)  V (p) + L(p).
Assumption 2 states that any leverage changes that are possible (and some may
be ruled out by stake-holders' ex post conicts of interest and restrictions on side-
payments) should be carried out so as to maximize the total value of the rm. This
is a natural assumption to make since the policy of maximizing W is obviously ex
ante ecient and will be followed if it can be enforced ex post.
Assumption 3 Firms can increase but not reduce their level of leverage.
Recall that in Proposition 4 we showed that, in the absense of side-payments,
marginal decreases in debt will be opposed by equity-holders while debt-holders will
resist increases in debt of similar maturity if X(p
b
) and X
0
(p
b
) are suciently small.
One may think of Assumption 3 as partially relaxing the hypothesis of Proposition 4
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by allowing side-payments from equity- to debt-holders but not in the other direction.
In these circumstances, if both groups can veto changes in the rm's capital structure,
the rm will be able to raise but not lower its leverage level.
If debt-holders are assumed to be relatively small and widely-dispersed, whereas
equity-holders are represented in negotiations by a single, unied management, then
it is quite plausible that side-payments from equity- to debt-holders are possible but
not vice versa. In eect, hold-out problems by small debt-holders preclude equity-
holders being compensated for changes in capital structure that would maximize rm
value.
The last assumption we require concerns the allocation of the benets of releverage
between the two dierent investor groups. A priori reasoning provides little guidance
here and we shall simply adopt the reasonable assumption that:
Assumption 4 Equity-holders receive a fraction, , of the benets of leverage changes,
where  2 [0; 1]
Finally, note that there is no contradiction between our assumption that feasible
changes are carried out so as to maximize rm value whereas liquidation decisions are
made in an inecient way by equity-holders maximizing the ex post value of their
claims. Liquidation involves equity-holders invoking limited liability and washing
their hands of the rm at a higher trigger level than that which maximizes total
rm value. As with leverage reductions, the problem could be mitigated if debt-
holders might be persuaded to make ex post concessions such as side-payments to
equity-holders. Supposing that hold-out problems by debt-holders preclude this is
consistent with our assumptions above.
3.2 Pricing The Firm with Leverage Adjustments
Let us see how the above assumptions combine to yield pricing expressions. For
some coupon ow level, b, one may think of the total value of the rm as comprising
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the discounted cash-ow with the current level of leverage (i.e., W (p
t
; b) as dened
in equations (11) and (12)) plus a continuum of options to raise the leverage level
by incremental amounts as prices increase. The reason these options will only be
exercised gradually as the output price rises is that if the price subsequently falls, the
higher the leverage, the greater the agency costs due to an inappropriately chosen
close-down price, p
b
.
Let
~
W (p
t
; b) be the total value of the rm including the option value associated
with releverage possibilities, and let H(p
t
; b) 
~
W (p
t
; b)  W (p
t
; b). If H(p
t
; b) is a
suciently smooth function of b, one will always be able to write it as an integral:
H(p
t
; b) =
R
1
b
G(p
t
; )d for some function G(:; :). This is a useful trick as one
may then interpret G(p
t
; b) as the value, at p
t
, of an option to increase the leverage
parameter, b, incrementally, i.e., from b to b + db.
Assumption 4 implies that the rm is closed down when prices fall to p
b
= p
b
(b)
where V
0
(p
b
) + @H(p
b
; b)=@p = 0. Raising b allows the rm to reap greater tax
savings but at the cost of a less ecient closure decision in the event that prices
decline. Since, by assumption, b cannot decline, it will only change when p
t
exceeds
its past peak, i.e. when
p
t
= p^
t
 sup
0t
fp

g : (30)
The main result of this section may be stated as:
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1 to 4, the total value of the rm,
~
W (p
t
; b(p^
t
)),
is:
~
W (p
t
; ; b(p^
t
)) = W (p
t
; b(p^)) +
Z
1
b(p^
t
)
G(p
t
; )d ; (31)
where p^
t
 sup
0t
fp

g. Here, G(p
t
; b) represents the value of an option to increase
leverage incrementally, when the current level of coupon payments is b. G(p
t
; b) is
given by:
G(p
t
; b) = 
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t
p
x
(b)
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where 
3
 (1 (p
x
(b)=p
b
(b))

1
 
2
)
 1
, and p
x
(b), and p
b
(b) may be found by solving for
the root respectively of: @G(p
x
; b)=@p =@
2
W (p
x
; b)=@p@b and V
0
(p
b
)+@H(p
b
; b)=@p =
0 for dierent values of b, where H(p
t
; b) =
R
1
b
G(p
t
; )d.
Thus, the value of the rm,
~
W (p; ; b(p^)), equals, at any given moment, the value of
the rm's cash ows assuming b = b(p^) where p^ is the highest price reached up to the
present, plus the value of a continuum of options to increase leverage incrementally
from b = b(p^) to 1.
Obtaining solutions for G(p
t
; b) is relatively straightforward. For a grid of b values,
one may solve the boundary conditions to obtain p
x
= p
x
(b) and p
b
= p
b
(b). Equation
(32) then yields G(p
t
; b) for dierent b.
Figure 5 shows W
b
 @W=@b and
~
W
b
 @
~
W=@b as functions of p. Incremental
leverage occurs when
~
W
b
smooth pastes to the horizontal axis as at p
x
in the gure.
The shaded vertical distance between W
b
and
~
W
b
is the value of the option exercised
at p
x
.
Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 2, one may see how the option to increase leverage
in the future shifts the optimal leverage schedule to the right as claimed in Section 1.
Leverage level b
x
is now only chosen when the price goes to p
x
, and not at the lower
price p
i
which applies when there is no option to wait. For any initial price, say p
i
,
the schedule
~
L
~
L gives the amount of leverage chosen when the rm is set up, b
i
, and
shows how bonds will be increased incrementally as and when p exceeds p
i
.
Note that the assumption made in this section that the output price process is
exogenously given (i.e., that there is no reecting barrier on prices due to free entry
by competitor rms) is not innocuous in this context. A reecting barrier would
reduce the option values associated with leverage increments that would have been
implemented at prices above the barrier if the latter were absent.
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The model of this section is closely linked to the analysis of irreversible investment
by Pindyck (1988). In Pindyck's case, incremental amounts of real capital are installed
by the rm as the output price rises but irreversibility means that, if prices fall,
the capital stock does not change. At any given moment, the current capital stock
depends upon the maximum output price so far attained.
In our model, as in Pindyck's, the total value of the rm equals the value of the
future cash ows assuming no change in the control variable (capital stock or coupon
ow, b, respectively) plus a continuum of option values associated with marginal
changes in the control.
4 CONCLUSION
This paper has priced corporate debt in an industry equilibrium with entry and exit
of rms. For general assumptions about the residual, post-bankruptcy value of the
rm, we derive the values of debt and equity. We show how, when equity-holders are
cash-constrained at entry, the demand elasticity for industry output crucially aects
the default premium on the bonds. If equity-holders are not constrained and can
freely choose the initial level of leverage, competitive pressure leads rms to reduce
leverage until the face value equals the residual value of the rm's assets at closure,
i.e., the bonds are riskless.
Much of our analysis is conducted under the assumption that the rm's leverage
level is xed once and for all when the rm is initially set up. Adopting this as-
sumption, we obtain simple, intuitive expressions for the value of debt that depend
explicitly on the price elasticity of demand for total industry output.
However, we think it is important to explore the implications of relaxing the
`xed leverage' assumption by allowing rms to increase their borrowing as their
protability improves. The degree to which a rm takes on debt when it is initially
set up may depend signicantly on the option it has to issue more bonds in future.
24
The observation that rms appear relatively under-levered given apparent bankruptcy
costs could reect the fact that the option to increase debt levels induces them to
take on relatively little debt to start with.
The last section, therefore, develops a dynamic theory of optimal leverage. As
we show, the value of the rm may be written as the value of its cash ow assuming
a xed level of leverage plus that of a continuum of options to increase borrowing.
These options are exercised progressively each time the price of the rm's output
exceeds its previous peak.
As a nal point, we have supposed throughout our analysis that the rm's debt
is of innite maturity. Various assumptions would allow one to price nite maturity
bonds within our framework. For example, one may suppose that the rm is funded
overwhelmingly with perpetuals and equity but that it issues a small amount of nite
maturity debt. In this case, the trigger levels for entry, exit etc., would be stationary
and the short debt may easily be priced using Fourier or other methods. Leland and
Toft (1996) has considered other assumptions that yield stationary over-all capital
structure and trigger prices and hance facilitate pricing of nite maturity bonds in
models similar to ours.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: First, consider the equity value. The general solution to
equations (5) and (6) are:
V (p) = A
0
+ A
1
p + A
2
p

1
+ A
3
p

2
; (34)
L(p) = C
0
+ C
1
p + C
2
p

1
+ C
3
p

2
: (35)
Take derivatives and substitute in (5) and (6). Equating coecients on like terms
yields: A
0
=  (1  )(w+ b)=r, A
1
= (1  )=(r ), C
0
= b=r, and C
1
= 0, while 
1
and 
2
are the negative and positive roots to ( 1)
2
=2+ = r. Since 
2
> 0, A
3
and C
3
must be zero if V (p) and L(p) are to approach the unlimited liabiity values
as p !1. A
2
and C
2
are then easily obtained using V (p
b
) = 0 and L(p
b
) = X(p
b
).
2
Proof of Proposition 2: Set @W (p
e
; b)=@b = 0 and then substitute for p
b
using
the expression in equation (11) and rearrange. 2
Proof of Proposition 3: We obtain p^

b
by solving @W

(p^

b
)=@p = 0. Taking
derivatives and rearranging yields the desired expression. 2
Proof of Proposition 4: Buying back one dollar of debt reduces the coupon ow,
b, by:
b
L(p
t
)
=
b

b
r
[1  (p
t
=p
b
)

1
] + (p
t
=p
b
)

1
X(p
b
)

: (36)
Now since:
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t
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=
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;(37)
=
(1  )
r
 
1 

p
t
p
b


1
!
: (38)
One may easily show that change in equity value @V (p
t
)=@bb=L(p
t
) < (1  ). Since
this is less than one dollar, equity-holders will never wish to carry out such a trans-
action.
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The impact on the value of existing bonds if the rm issues more debt is:
b
r
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0
@
1 
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t
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b
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1
1
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t
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b
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b
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+
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[X
0
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b
)p
b
  
1
X(p
b
)]
)
: (39)
The right hand side is negative if X(p
b
) and X
0
(p
b
) are small, and, in this case,
bond-holders will never favour increases in leverage.
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 1. Take
derivatives of the general solutions given in (34) and (35), substitute in (5) and (6)
and equate coecients on like terms. The boundary conditions for the equity value
form two linear systems in the coecients, A
2
and A
3
, and C
2
and C
3
, respectively.
Solving these two systems by inverting a pair of simple, two-by-two matrices yields
the required results. 2
Proof of Proposition 6: Solving for debt and equity values in an industry equi-
librium for a given b=r when b is large enough to imply that debt is risky debt, one
obtains the expressions in Proposition 5. If debt is risky, debt values drop discretely
if the rm in question goes bankrupt. If all rms adopt a particular leverage, b, for
an individual rm total rm value at entry is increased if it adopts a leverage level
slightly below b as in this case it will never experience bankruptcy. Firms will there-
fore have an incentive to undercut each other's leverage level until there is no jump
in bond values at bankruptcy. This occurs when b=r = X(p
b
), i.e., the debt principal
equals the residual value at closure. Since, in industry equilibrium, only a fraction
of rms actually close at p
b
, (and bond-holders of rms that do close are indierent
between closure and continuation) the latter price acts as a reecting barrier. Hence,
the boundary condition L
0
(p
b
) = 0 must hold. Solving for the debt and equity values
with the other boundary conditions, V (p
e
) + b=r = K, L(p
b
) = b=r, V
0
(p
e
) = 0,
V
0
(p
b
) = 0, yields the results in the proposition. 2
Proof of Proposition 7: As the dierence between two asset prices, H may be
thought of as the value of a security. Since holders of this security only receive
capital gains income, H must satisfy the equation:
r H(p
t
; b) = p
t
@H(p
t
; b)
@p
+

2
2
p
2
t
@
2
H(p
t
; b)
@p
2
: (40)
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Taking derivatives with respect to b, we obtain:
r G(p
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; b) = p
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t
; b)
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2
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t
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2
: (41)
The general solution to this equation is:
G(p; b) = C
1
(b)
 
p
p
b
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
1
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2
(b)
 
p
p
x
!

2
: (42)
p
x
is the price at which it is optimal for the rm to increase its leverage incrementally
and is a function of the current leverage level, b. At p
x
, it must be the case that
@
~
W (p
x
(b); b)=@b = 0. But, as one may easily show, this implies that:
G(p
x
(b); b) =
@W (p
x
(b); b)
@b
: (43)
Also, when p
t
= p
b
(b) and the current level of leverage is b, the rm will be liquidated,
so options to relever must cease to have value. Therefore:
H(p
b
(b); b) = 0 8 b : (44)
If we apply the boundary condition:
G(p
b
(b); b) = 0 8 b ; (45)
and let G(p; b) = 0 for all pairs (p; b) where p < p
b
(b), then
Z
1
b
G(p
b
; )d = H(p
b
(b); b) = 0 8 b ; (46)
as required. Lastly, the optimal exercise price, p
x
(b), may be obtained from a smooth-
pasting condition:
@G(p
x
; b)
@p
=
@
@p
"
@W (p; b)
@b
#





p=p
x
: (47)
Solving this yields p
x
as a function of b.
To complete the derivation of G, take derivatives of the general solution of the
dierential equation, substitute in the boundary conditions and determine the free
parameters in the usual way. 2
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Footnotes
1. Also see Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) for an extremely interesting analysis of
exit consent renegotiations of public bond issues.
2. The framework of Section 1 resembles models employed in a number of recent
papers on corporate bond pricing, namely Anderson and Sundaresan (1996),
Leland (1994a) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1993). An important feature
of these models is that, unlike earlier work by, for example, Merton (1974) and
Black and Cox (1976), they suppose that bankruptcy is triggered by cash ow
rather than net worth considerations. Leland (1994a) argues persuasively that
bond covenants concerning net worth are hard to enforce and that it is more
reasonable to think of equity-holders as eectively choosing the bankruptcy
point through their decision of when to cease meeting coupon payments.
3. We abstract here from the fact that the marginal tax rate for negative earnings
may be zero. In practice there are many ways in which companies can use
tax losses to oset other income including the sale of subsidiaries embodying
tax losses and leasing transactions. It is, therefore, probably more realistic to
assume that  remains unchanged when earnings turn negative than to assume
that it drops to zero.
4. Black and Cox (1976) and Leland (1994a) model bankruptcy in a similar way.
5. To anticipate our results somewhat, note that in our framework Merton's ap-
proach would correspond to assuming that, upon bankruptcy, bond-holders re-
ceive the unlimited liability value of the rm's income stream, i.e., X(p
t
) =
(1   )[p
t
=(r   )   (w=r)]. On the other hand, the equivalent of Mello and
Parsons in our framework would be X(p
t
) = (1  )[p
t
=(r  )  (w=r)]  (1 
)[p
l
=(r   )  (w=r)](p
t
=p
l
)

1
where p
l
=  
1
=(1  
1
)w(r   )=r and  is as
dened in Proposition 1.
6. This does not represent much of a loss of generality since, an economy with risk
averse agents may be transformed into one with risk neutrality by the change
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of measure arguments suggested by Harrison and Kreps (1979). The signicant
restriction one has to make is to suppose that the nancial structure of the rm
does not aect the Radon Nikodym derivative for this change of measure, i.e.,
the state prices are invariant to the rm's nancing decisions. Adopting this
assumption, one should interpret the term k
t
in (2) as the risk-adjusted drift
and not the actual instantaneous mean of the process.
7. We assume that r > . One may show that otherwise, claims to the rm's
earning stream would be of innite value which is obviously inconsistent with
equilibrium.
8. Share oerings are equivalent, in this context, to capital injections since existing
equity-holders could always buy the new issue.
9. In optimal stopping problems of this sort, a necessary condition for optimality is
that the derivatives with respect to the state variable of the optimizing agent's
value function and of the payo received after stopping are equal at the trigger
level.
10. If the assumption that X(p)  0 for all p  0 is relaxed, then debt and equity
values equal the solutions in Proposition 1 except that the closure price is the
maximum of p
b
(as dened in the proposition) and of supfp : X(p) < 0g.
Subsequent propositions may be similarly generalized.
11. BB itself crosses the horizontal axis at  
1
=(1   
1
)(r   )=rw which is the
closure price for the pure equity rm when X(p) = 0 for all p.
12. Leland (1994a) found a similar result in a related model.
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Figure 1: A SIMPLE BENCHMARK MODEL
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LEGENDS FOR FIGURES
Figure 1
Debt and equity values (L(p) and V (p)) appear as functions of the rm's output
price. The post-bankruptcy, residual value, X(p) is assumed to be zero so V and L
equal zero at the bankruptcy trigger price, p
b
. Optimal choice of p
b
by equity-holders
implies that V
0
(p
b
) = 0.
Figure 2
The optimal coupon, b

, is shown for dierent entry prices, p
e
, as the zeros of the
derivative of total rm value with respect to the coupon,W
b
. Entry prices and optimal
coupon levels are positively correlated.
Figure 3
Appropriate choice of units allow one to show the bond value, L(p), and industry
demand, q(p) intersecting at the bankruptcy trigger price, p
b
. The boundary condition
for the bonds at p
b
balances capital gains and expected losses and corresponds to the
equality, 
1
= 
2
.
Figure 4
In the industry equilibrium, both the total rm value, W , and the equity value, V ,
smooth-paste at p
e
as entry by new rms prevents p
t
from rising any further. At
p
b
the slope of W is such that the capital gain from an output price rise equals the
expected capital loss from a price fall. If the price elasticity, , is low, few rms must
exit to keep p
t
above p
b
.
Figure 5
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Optimal marginal increases in the coupon ow occur when the change in rm value,
~
W
b
, equals zero. At this point, the value of the exercised leverage option, G, exactly
osets the increase in the `constant-coupon rm value', W
b
. For a given entry price,
optimal leverage is lower when there are options to increase the coupon in future.
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